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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SIDNEY STEVENS IMPLEl\IENT COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and .Appellant, 
vs. 
C. K. BOWERBANK, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and the defendant are the owners of 
tracts of land situate on the East side of Ogden Avenue 
between Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Streets in Og-
den City. The parties, on the 11th day of December, 
1945, entered into a party wall agreement. (Exhibit A) 
The agreement provided that the party wall, when con-
structed, should be one (1) foot in thickness with piers 
installed therein for the support of the roof, one-half 
of which was to stand upon the lot of each party for 
the full length of one hundred (100) feet. The agree-
ment recites that the plaintiff was to erect a building 
upon its lot, the South wall of which was to be used as 
a party wall between the parties. 
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The plaintiff had employed H. J. Craven &. ~o?s, 
Engineers, to survey the premises and locate the diVISion 
line. 
The agreement grants the defendant the right to 
use the party wall for the whole length, or any part 
thereof, in relation to the construction of a building 
which the defendant may thereafter construct, and to 
sink joists into the wall to the extent of six (6) inches. 
The agreement further provided that: 
' ' That said party of the second part * * * shall 
as soon as the building to be constructed by 
the party of the first part shall have been com-
pleted to the point where the total cost of the 
South wall shall have been ascertained, shall pay 
to said party of the first part or its assigns the 
full one-half of the total cost of said South wall." 
The agreement also provided that the boundary line 
fixed by plaintiff's surveyor and marked upon the prem-
ises was to be considered the center line of the South 
wall, half of which was to be constructed on each side 
of said line so established. 
The agreement provided for other usual provisions 
ordinarily contained in party wall agreements, which 
are not material to the issues in this case. 
Prior to the construction of the wall, it was ascer-
tained by the defendant that the survey made by H. J. 
Craven & Sons was not the correct survey and did not 
establish the true division line between the properties 
of the plaintiff and defendant. (Tr. 105) The defendant 
employed William Stowe, a licensed surveyor and an 
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t 
.:.. 
engineer employed by Ogden City, to s1n·ye~' the land of 
the defendant and to establish the diYision line between 
the properties of the plaintiff and the defendant, and by 
such sniTey it was discovered that the line established 
by Craven was upon the property owned by the defend-
ant and South of where it should have been. (Tr. 108-
109) This fact was called to the attention of the plain-
tiff's officers and by mutual agreement between the 
officers of the plaintiff and the defendant, the true di-
vision line between the properties was established and 
agreed upon by the parties, and the division line was 
marked upon the sidewalk in front of said properties 
adjacent to the property line. It was then agreed by 
the parties that the center of the wall should be con-
structed on that line so established. (Tr. 107-108) Plain-
tiff proceeded with the construction of its building and 
the party wall. 
After the completion of the building, the defendant 
discovered that the party wall, being the South wall of 
plaintiff's building, was built 10% inches South of the 
division line as established by the Stowe survey and 
wholly upon the property of the defendant. (Tr. 109) 
The wall was constructed during the winter time, and 
the survey mark was covered with snow, scaffolding, 
and other debris, and the defendant consequently did 
not discover the error in its location until after the re-
moval of the snow, scaffolding, and debris, and after 
the completion of the wall. (Tr. 116-117) 
Upon completion of the party wall, the plaintiff 
claimed the cost thereof amounted to $4,435.00, and de-
manded that the defendant pay one-half of this sum. 
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The defendant refused to pay this amount contending 
that such sum was not the cost of the wall. After the 
completion of the wall, the defendant obtained from C. 
B. Lauch Construction Company, plaintiff's contractor, 
a statement showing that the total cost of the party wall 
was $2,530.00, (Exhibit 1) and offered to pay the plain-
tiff one-half thereof, being the sum of $1,265.00. The 
plaintiff refused to accept this amout and filed suit to 
recover the sum of $2,217 .50. The defendant claimed 
that the party wall was built entirely upon his land, 
the center line of which was 103,4 inches South of the 
true property line. The defendant filed an answer to 
plaintiff's complaint, alleging that the total cost of 
the wall was $2,530.00 and admitted that he was in-
debted to the plaintiff in the sum of $1,265.00, and filed 
a counterclaim in the amount of $1,000.00 for damages 
suffered by reason of the plaintiff constructing the 
party wall on land of the defendant, and asserting that 
the defendant was only indebted to the plaintiff, there-
fore, in the amount of $350.00. The case was tried by 
a jury and was submitted by the Court to the jury upon 
the four special interrogatories as set forth in appel-
lants brief, and the interrogatories were answered as 
set forth in said brief. (Page 6) On the 30th day of 
December, 1948, judgment was entered in favor of the 
plaintiff in the sum of $1,375.00, with interest, and for 
the defendant judgment was entered as damages which 
he suffered for the encroachment on his land in the 
amount of $151.42, with interest, which was set off 
against the amount of plaintiff's judgment, leaving a 
balance due the plaintiff in the amount of $1,223.58, 
with interest from May 1, 1946. 
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The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. The 
motion was denied on the g-round that it was not filed 
in time. The plaintiff then moYed the court to file a 
motion for a new trial beyond the statutory time. This 
motion \Yas supported by an affidavit of plaintiff's coun-
sel. Defendant objected to granting of motion. The 
objection thereto was supported by affidavit of defend-
ant's counsel denying material allegations set forth in 
the affidant of plaintiff's counsel. The court then de-
nied the motion and refused to grant the relief sought 
thereby. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
DEFENDANT IS NOT BOUND BY STATE-
MENT MADE BY BIDDER TO PLAINTIFF QUO'l,-
ING COST OF WAI.JL, DEFENDANT NOT BEING A 
PARTY TO SUCH BID OR AGREEMENT FOR CON-
STRUCTION OF PLATNTIF:B,'S BUILDING PlJR-
SUANT TO SUCH BID. 
The party wall agreement executed between the 
plaintiff and defendant, a copy of which is attached to 
plaintiff's complaint and marked "Exhibit A" (Page 
003) (also plaintiff's "Exhibit A") was executed by the 
plaintiff and the defendant on the 11th day of Decem-
ber, 1945. The agreement provided for the construction 
of a party wall, one foot in thickness. The agreement 
further provided: 
'' rhe said party of the second part * - * shall as 
soon as said building to be constructed by the 
party of the first part shall have been completed 
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to a point where the total cost of the South wall 
shall have been ascertained, shall pay to the party 
of the first part, or its asl::!igns, the full one-half 
of the total cost ot said South wall." 
It will be noted that general specifications in re-
lation to the construction of plaintiff's building were 
prepared by Art Shreeve, plaintiff's Architect, (plain-
tiff's Exhibit B) which bears date of December 1st, 
1945. rrhere is, however' an addendum to these specifi-
cations, shown in this exhibit on the last page thereof, 
dated December 26, 1945. The contract for the con-
struction of the building was entered into between C. 
B. Lauch Construction Company and Sidney Stevens 
Implement Company, the plaintiff herein, on the 26th 
day of December, 1945. The general specifications 
(plaintiif's Exhibit B, page 19) provided that: 
''All exterior walls shall be 12 inch walls, par-
titions 6 inches. Front elevation shall be Face 
Brick, selected by Architect, balance of exterior 
walls common brick, and partitions, tile.'' 
The specifications (plaintiff's Exhibit B, page 20} 
provided that the contractor is to state in his bid a lump 
sum amount for the construction of the South wall. 
The bid of C. B. Lauch Construction Company bears 
date of December 17, 1945. On the 18th day of Decem-
ber, 1945, a letter was written by C. B. Lauch (plaintiff's 
Exhibit D) in which a quotation for a brick walt with 
excavation, footings, and reinforced steel columns, ac-
cording to plans and specifications, is addressed to the 
plaintiff's Architect, quoting the sum of $4,435.00. This 
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was prior to the signing of the contract between the 
plaintiff and the Lauch Construction Company for the 
construction of plaintiff's building. On the 26th day of 
December, 19-!5, on the date contract was sig·ned, an 
addendum was added to the contract (see last page 
Plaintiff's Exhibit B) whereby a change was made in 
the construction of the Exterior walls and which is as 
follows: 
''Exterior Walls: Change to read as follows: 
Front elevation 12" face brick. Balance of walls 
to be constructed of Lava Ash Blocks, as manu-
factured by the "Utah Concrete Pipe Company", 
size 10" x 16". '' 
The quotation given by C. B. Lauch Construction 
Company, in connection with its bid, was based upon the 
construction of a 12 inch brick wall, the specifications 
being changed subsequent to the quotation and, 
therefore, the quotation of the purported cost is not 
material, under any circumstances, in determining the 
cost of the wall. 
It should be noted that the party wall agreement 
provided for the construction of the party wall one foot 
in thickness. The plaintiff failed to carry out the 
terms of its agreement with the defendant in that the 
wall actually constructed was but 10 inches in thickness. 
The defendant asserts that an attempt on the part of 
the plaintiff to fix the cost of the wall prior to the con-
struction of it, violates the terms of the party wall agree-
ment in that the agreement expressly states: 
''Party of the second part * * * shall as soon as 
the building to be constructed by party of the first 
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part shall hatve been completed to the point where 
the total cost of the South wall shaU have ~een 
ascertained shall pay * * * the full one-half of the 
total cost.'' 
While the defendant asserts that he is not bound 
by the contract entered into between the plaintiff and 
C. B. Lauch Construction Company, insofar as the quo-
tation for the cost of the wall is concerned, still there is 
no evidence before the Court as to any compliance by 
the contractor with the plaintiff, as provided in its 
specifications, in fixing the total cost of the South wall 
of the building after the change in construction from a 
12 inch brick wall to a 10 inch Lava Ash Block wall. 
There is, however, before the Court, evidence in-
troduced by the defendant, that after the construction 
of the wall, the defendant requested the C. B. Lauch 
Construction Company to furnish him a statement of 
costs of the wall to the plaintiff (see testimony of .Jack 
Hilton, Tr. 31-32 and 33). Hilton, Superintendent of the 
C. B. Lauch Construction Company, after taking into 
consideration the entire contract price of the building, 
computed the cost of the party wall to be $2,530.00 (de-
fendant's Exhibit 1). The construction of the party wall 
was not completed until about May, 1946 (Tr. 31). Jack 
Hilton was employed by C. B. Lauch Construction Com-
pany as Superintendent upon the construction of the 
party wall in April, 1946. ( Tr. 23) The statement which 
was furnished the defendant setting forth the cost of 
the party wall, was given by Jack Hilton at the direction 
of C. B. Laueh. (Tr. 47) The plaintiff is bound by the 
statement of his own contractor establishing the cost 
of the party wall. 
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The defendant has been at all times willing to pay 
for the one-half of the artual cost of the party wall, but 
has been unwilling· to pay the amount which plaintiff 
seeks to impose upon him, which is excessive. It should 
be obseiTed that the contract cost of the entire building 
includes the rost of construction of the other three walls, 
the cement floor, roofing, wiring, plumbing, stairs, ex-
ca,?ation, back filling, Yanlt, ramp, lathing, plastering, 
painting·, hardware, glazing (including plate glass win-
dows on front of building·), face brick on front, and all 
steel (except structural steel to be furnished by plain-
tiff, but installed by contractor), and all necessary ma-
terials and work to be done in connection with the com-
pletion of plaintiff's building. The plaintiff seeks to 
establish the cost of the party wall to be in excess of 14 
of the entire cost of plaintiff's building. Such cost is 
obviously exorbitant and beyond all reason. 
If the cost of a party wall were permitted to be es-
tablished by such a method where the adjoining owner 
was not a party to the building contract, under plaintiff's 
theory, any price which was fixed by the parties to the 
contract between themselves, would establish the cost 
of such wall, which the other party would be obligated 
to pay. Defendant contends that this is not good law. 
Such a method would open the doors to collusion and 
fraud. In other words, the defendant believes that he 
has not been billed for his portion of the total cost of 
the wall, but for the cost of the wall and a substantial 
portion of the balance of plaintiff's building. 
The Court instructed the jury upon the method of 
determining the cost of the party wall as follows: (023). 
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''You are instructed that under the terms and 
provisions of the party wall agreement entered 
into between the plaintiff and the defendant, the 
defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff· one-half 
( lJ2) of the costs incurred by plaintiff in the con-
struction of the party wall and in this connection 
you are instructed that cost and reasonable mar-
ket value are not synonymous terms. The word 
''cost'' as used in this agreement means the 
actual cost to the plaintiff for the construction 
of said party wall. That is, the amount which 
the plaintiff actually paid to the contractor for 
the construction of the wall in question. This 
amount includes not only the cost of the materials 
and labor to the contractor, but in addition 
thereto the amount he charged for his overhead 
and profits. So it is for you to determine from 
all of the evidence in this case what was the 
amount which the contractor charged the plain-
tiff for the building of the wall.'' 
Upon such instruction and after deliberation, the jury, 
from the evidence concluded that the total cost of the 
wall to the plaintiff amounted to $2,750.00, thereby fixing 
the amount which the defendant was to pay in the sum 
of $1,375.00. 
POINT II. 
THE COST OF THE PARTY WALL IS ES-
TABLISHED BY TESTIMONY OJ!, CONTRACTOR 
CONSTRUCTING SAME AFTER COJ\fPLETION OF 
WALL AND SUBSTANTIATED BY OTHER COM-
PETENT CONTRACTORS. 
The testimony of Jack Hilton, employed as Superin-
tendent in the construction of the Stevens Building, was 
10 
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conclusiYe t=-vidence to. establish the actual cost to the 
plaintiff of the party wall. All of the figures of Mr. 
Lauch which were used in the preparation of the bid 
were offered in evidence and Jack Hilton computed the 
cost of the party wall upon such fig11res, including the 
overhead of the contractor and the percentage of profit 
charged on the entire building. (Defendant's exhibit 3, 
Tr. 96¥2 and 97). 
Testimony was given by other contractors as to the 
cost of the party wall. Fred Carr, Jr., of the Clarence 
Waterfall Company, computed the total actual cost at 
$2,348.87. (Defendant's Exhibits 5, Tr. 57). Attention 
should be called to the fact that Carr figured the profit 
of the contractor at 15% rather than 10% which was 
used by Lauch in his estimate. (Tr. 60) 
Another contractor, Andrew Isaakson, computed the 
cost of the wall to the plaintiff at approximately $2,500.-
00 (Tr. 89). The testimony of these two contractors sub-
stantiates the evidence given by Jack Hilton as to the 
cost of the party wall and is proper evidence to estab-
lish cost of the wall. 
Kempf vs. Ranger 
155 NW 1059. (Minn.) 
It was brought out on cross-examination of Mr. C. 
H. Stevens, President of Sidney Stevens Implement 
Company, that the full contract price of the building 
bad never been paid Lauch Construction Company, and 
that Lauch Construction Company had filed suit in the 
District Court of Weber County against Sidney Stevens 
11 
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Implement Company for the sum of $1,579.52. (Tr. 18) 
Plaintiff's Counsel attempts to use this fact as a reason 
why Jack Hilton' Lauch's Superintendent, appeared as 
a witness for the defendant. We contend that this is 
no proper deduction on the part or such counsel. Jack 
Hilton is now no longer employed by C. B. Lauch Con-
struction Company, nor was he in the employment of 
such ,Company at the time his testimony was given in 
the trial of this action. (Tr. 22) It is true that C. B. 
Lauch had gone to Boise, Idaho, to engage in the con-
tracting business. The plaintiff, however, had the op-
portunity of taking Lauch's deposition, but failed to do 
so. It is true that C. B. Lauch wrote a letter (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit L) to one of the counsel for the defendant on 
the 17th day of November, 1947, just prior to the com-
mencement of this action, which purported to state the 
cost of the party wall as $3,127.00. Mr. Young re-
quested defendant's counsel to produce this, and then 
offered it in evidence. The testimony of Jack Hilton, 
(Tr. 35) however, reveals that at the time that Lauch 
wrote this letter, he did not have the data concerning 
the construction of the Sidney Stevens Building; that 
all of this information, and even at the time of the trial 
of this case, was in the hands of Jack Hilton. 
POINT III. 
THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE 
PROPERTIES OF THE PARTIES WAS ESTAB· 
LISHED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, COMPRO· 
MISING A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
ARISING AFTER EXECUTION OF PARTY WALL 
AGREEMENT AND ORA VE,N SURVEY, AND DOES 
NOT COME WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
12 
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It is to be admitted that the surveys of the two sur-
veyors, that is Craven, who "'as employed by the plain-
tiff, and Stowe, who \YHs employed by the defendant, 
conflicted. There was eYidence introduced in relation 
to these conflicts by both parties. Plaintiff, however, 
contends that the parties, by the terms of the party 
wall agreement, established a line by mutual agreement 
based upon the Craven su1Tey. Defendant's position, 
is that prior to the time of commencing construction of 
the building, it '"as ascertained that an error was made 
in the Craven Survey. The fact of this error was called 
to the attention of the officers of the plaintiff corpor-
ation. (Tr. 105-106-107 and 149) Mr. Frank J. Stevens, 
Jr., Secretary and Treasurer of the plaintiff corpora-
tion, testified that when such discrepancy was called 
to his attention, he (Stevens) and Bowerbank, in com-
pany with the architect, jlr. Lauch, and Mr. Richard-
son (l\Ir. Lauch's superintendent at the time) went to 
the building location and agreed upon a boundary line 
between the properties and made a mark on the side-
walk opposite the line agreed upon (Tr. 149-150), and 
agreed that the party wall should be so constructed that 
the center of the same would be upon such boundary 
line. 
The evidence also shows, through the testimony of 
Mr. Bowerbank, that prior to the time that Frank J. 
Stevens, Jr., and he, went to locate the center line of the 
party wall, a discussion was had in the office of the 
Sidney Stevens ·Implement Company concerning the 
same; In addition to Bowerbank and Frank J. Stevens, 
Jr., being present, there was Stowe, the suveyor, and 
C. H. Stevens, President of the Sidney Stevens Imple-
13 
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ment Company. The evidence also shows that they 
agreed at that time to use the Stowe survey (Tr. 107) 
and C. H. Stevens, the President of the Sidney Stevens 
Implement Company, sent Frank J. Stevens, Jr., Sec-
retary and Treasurer, down to the lot line, and that the 
foreman of the Lauch Construction Company was told 
jointly by Frank J. Stevens, Jr., and Bowerbank where 
to place the party wall, which was not upon the Craven 
Survey, but upon a new line agreed upon two inches 
North of Stowe survey. (Tr. 107). 
Plaintiff contends that this oral agreement was in 
violation of the Statute of Frauds and cites several 
authorities in support. We submit that the cases cited 
by the plaintiff are not in point with the instant case. 
The cases cited hold that title or any interest in real 
estate cannot be transferred or conveyed unless by writ-
ten instrument. In this case there was a dispute as to 
the location of the true boundary line between the 
properties of the parties to this action. The dispute 
did not arise until after the survey had been made by 
Craven and after the execution of the party wall agree-
ment. A new agreement fixing the boundary line was 
entered into between the parties, which agreement super-
seded the prior one and which was executed by the 
marking of the line and the instructions to the contractor 
to proceed with the erection of the party wall on the line 
agreed upon. Such oral agreement between adjoining 
owners establishing a boundary line which was un-
certain does not come within the provisions of the Stat-
ute of Frauds, and does not violate the provisions of the 
Laws of the State of Utah in relation to conveyance of 
real estate, neither does it violate the parol evidence 
rule. 
14 
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Tietjen Ys. Dobson, 13~ SE ~~:2 (Georg-ia) 
69 ALR 1408 
Tripp Ys. Bag-ley, 7-! Utah 57 
276 Pac. 912 
69 ALR 1417 
Bemis Ys. Bradley, 139 Atl. 593 (:l\Iaine) 
69 ALR 1399 
8 Am. Jur. 801 
69 ALR 1430 
131 ALR 421 
Defendant submits that the case of Tripp vs. Bagley, 
74 Utah 57, cited by theplaintiff is favorable to the 
defendant's position. This case holds that' where there 
is a dispute about the true boundary line between prop-
erty owners, a parol agreement establishing- such bound-
ary line is valid and not within the Statute of Frauds. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of rrripp vs. 
Bagley, quotes with approval Tiffany on Real Prop-
erty, Volume 1 (2d ed.) 294: 
''An agreement between adjoining owners as 
to the location of a boundary line, though merely 
oral, is not, it is generally conceded, invalid as 
being within the Statute of Frauds, provided the 
agreement is followed by actual or constructive 
possession by each of the owners up to the line 
so agreed upon, and provided further, that the 
proper location of the line is uncertain or in 
dispute; the theory being that the agreement 
does not, in such case involve any transfer of 
title to land, but merely an application of the 
language of the instruments under which the 
owners claim.'' 
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The plaintiff and the defendant took constructive 
possession of the land on each side up to the line so 
agreed upon, by marking the line, and by instructing the 
foreman of the Construction Company to construct the 
center of the party wall upon such line. 
The case of Bemis vs. Bradley above quoted, holds: 
''An agreement fixing a boundary line under 
the belief that it is the true line, when in fact it 
is not, is not binding and may be set aside by 
either party when the mistake is discovered, 
unless some principle of estoppel prevents it, as 
where the rights of innocent third parties have 
intervened.'' 
"The weight of authority is that, where the 
intention was to establish a line according to the 
true boundary, and by mistake the parties agreed 
upon a line which does not conform to such a 
boundary, the line so agreed on is not conclusive 
and the agreement may be set aside by either 
party.'' 
Under the ruling in this case the defendant is not 
bound by the designation of the boundary line between 
the properties as surveyed by Craven when it was after-
wards ascertained that there was a mistake in such sur-
vey. 
POINT IV. 
DEFENDANT SUFFERED DAMAGES BY EN-
CROACHMENT OF PARTY WALL UPON HIS 
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PROPERTY AT LEAST TO THE l\IAHKET VALUE 
OF L.A.XD TAI~EX BY SUCH ENCROACHMENT. 
The Court permitted testimony as to the Yalue of 
defendant's land upon whirh plaintiff encroached as 
the measure of damag·es suffered by the defendant of 
such eneroachment. The plaintiff contends that if the 
defendant were entitled to damages, the measure of the 
same should be the difference between the value of 
defendant's property before and the value of the prop-
erty after the encroaehment. Even if this method were 
the proper method for determining the measure of dam-
ages, the only one who would be prejudiced by failure 
to follow such method of determining the resulting dam-
ages, is the defendant himself. He would be entitled 
at least to the value of the land by the encroachment. 
The plaintiff cites 2 C. J. S. 33. The case cited in 
support of the text statement is Goldsmidt vs. ~Iayor of 
New York, et al, 14 App. Div. 135, 43 N. Y. S. 447. 
This case substantiates the defendant's theory. While 
such decision holds that the proper measure of damages 
for a permanent encroachment is the difference in value 
of the premises encroached upon befor:e and after such 
encroachment, it implies that the damages suffered is 
not only the value of the land taken, but may inelude 
additional damages for diminution of value of the whole 
of such premises. The defendant in the Goldsmidt case 
claimed that the measure of damages was the actual or 
market value of the land taken by the eneroachment. 
The New York Court in the deeision states: 
"It seems to be conceived by the defendant 
that he is only liable here for the actual value of 
the property, and the value is to be estimated by 
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finding out how much of the land of the plaintiff 
was worth a square foot, and charging the de-
fendant for the number of square feet taken at 
that rate. It is quite clear that this is entirely 
erroneous. The depreciation to a city lot by en-
croachment upon it is not necessarily to be 
measured in that way. It depends entirely upon 
other considerations. If one builds a wall upon 
his neighbor's land along the side or the rear 
of it, it may be that the damages in that case 
would be largely measured by the amount of land 
taken, although other considerations would un-
doubtedly enter into the damages in such a case 
as that, but where the encroachment is along the 
front of the lot, it is easy to say that an entirely 
different mode of reaching the damages must 
be arrived at. The injury to plaintiff's premises 
in such a case does not depend upon the amount 
of the land taken but upon the value of the land 
which is left, and that, as may easily be seen, 
is governed not only by the situation and the 
location of the land that is left, but by the place 
where the encroachment is made. If a man 
should put a column in the middle of his neigh-
bor's City lot the damages would be much more 
serious than it would be if the same erection 
were put in the corner of the back end of the 
lot and nobody would say that in either case the 
tr:spasser was to be charged . simply with the 
value of the square foot of land, which he had 
taken possession of.'' 
POINT V. 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR· IN DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELIE:B-, UNDER 
SECTION 104-14-4. 
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The plaintiff charges error on the part of the Court 
in denying the motion for a new trial, upon the ground 
that it was not filed within time, and cites error in not 
permitting- the plaintiff to file a motion for a new trial 
beyond the statutory time. Plaintiff quotes certain rules 
. of the District Court which require the giving of notice 
by the Cle~·k of the signing of Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law, and Decree. The rule which the plain-
tiff relies upon is Rule 17, which provides as follows: 
''Notice by Clerk of Decision: When a de-
cision is rendered by the Court upon a matter 
under advisement or in the absence of counsel, 
such counsel as were absent shall be given, by 
the Clerk, written notice of the desicion by mail. 
Such notices shall contain the name and number 
of the case, a statement of the decision such as 
'Defendant's demurrer overruled' or 'Judgment 
for plaintiff'." 
This rule applies to matters which are taken under 
advisement and does not apply in the instant case, where 
the verdict had already been rendered and plaintiff's 
attorney at the direction of the Court, had prepared 
and served upon defendant's counsel and had submitted 
to the Court Findings and Judgment on verdict. The 
case of 
Cody vs. Cody, 47 Utah 456 
154 Pac. 952 
is decisive in this matter. In this decision it is stated: 
''The party who prepares the Findings and 
Conclusions, and Decree, must of necessity * * * 
be deemed to have notice of the decision, and 
thence is not entitled to notice thereof.'' 
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Plaintiff's counsel contends that he had no know-
ledge that the Findings and Judgment had been signed 
on December 30, 1948, until several days afterwards, 
and that immediately upon learning that they had been 
signed, plaintiff's counsel prepared, served and filed 
notice of intention to move for a new trial on January 
6, 1949. The plaintiff's motion asking for relief to file 
out of time, was supported by the affidavit of plain-
tiff's counsel (page 048). This was objected to by the 
defendant and his objection was supported by affidavit 
of Samuel C. Powell, one of counsel for the defendant, 
(Page 044-045) countering and denying the material 
allegations set forth in affidavit of plaintiff's counsel. 
The Court considered the record and both affidavits and 
denied the motion. The trial Court was the judge of the 
facts and did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant asserts that thejudgment of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL C. POWELL, 
SAMUEL H. BARKER, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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